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The Continuing Cost of Privatization: 
Extra Payments to Medicare Advantage 
Plans Jump to $11.4 Billion in 2009
Brian Biles, Jonah Pozen, and stuart Guterman
ABSTRACT: The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 explicitly increased Medicare pay-
ments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. As a result, MA plans have, for the past 
six years, been paid more for their enrollees than they would be expected to cost in tradi-
tional fee-for-service Medicare. Payments to MA plans in 2009 are projected to be 13 
percent greater than the corresponding costs in traditional Medicare—an average of $1,138 
per MA plan enrollee, for a total of $11.4 billion. Although the extra payments are used to 
provide enrollees additional benefits, those benefits are not available to all beneficiaries—
but they are financed by general program funds. If payments to MA plans were instead 
equal to the spending level under traditional Medicare, the more than $150 billion in sav-
ings over 10 years could be used to finance improved benefits for the low-income elderly 
and disabled, or for expanding health-insurance coverage.
                    
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The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) included a broad set of provi-
sions intended to expand the role of private health plans in Medicare. Included 
among these were increased payments to private health plans.
The higher level of payments for Medicare Advantage (MA) private plans 
was based on a belief that, following an upfront investment to stabilize plan par-
ticipation and increase beneficiary enrollment, “private plans and competition 
will help drive down the explosive growth of Medicare spending.”1 However, 
since 2004, the MMA policies have resulted in substantial extra payments—that 
is, payments that exceed comparable costs in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. 
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As estimates began to indicate the magnitude of 
the extra payments to MA plans, Congress’s perspec-
tive on these payment polices shifted.2 The Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 used savings from phasing out 
MA budget-neutral risk adjustment (see discussion 
below) to offset the costs of deferring a scheduled 
reduction in Medicare payments to physicians. The 
Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act passed 
by the House of Representatives in 2007 contained 
provisions (which did not become law) that would 
have used a complete phaseout of MA extra payments 
to finance improved benefits for low-income Medicare 
beneficiaries, to defer additional physician payment 
cuts, and to improve benefits for low-income children 
in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. 
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), enacted in July 2008, 
used savings from a phaseout of double payments to 
MA plans for indirect medical education costs (see 
below) to finance the deferral of additional scheduled 
reductions in physician payments. MIPPA also pro-
vided that, for the first time, most Private Fee-for-
Service MA plans must, by January 2011, have con-
tracts with physicians and other providers (i.e., estab-
lish provider networks).
As the Obama administration and the 111th 
Congress prepared to take office, more attention 
focused on MA overpayments. In fall 2008, the Obama 
campaign said: “We need to eliminate the excessive 
subsidies to Medicare Advantage plans and pay them 
the same amount it would cost to treat the same 
patients under regular Medicare.”3 More recently, the 
president said: “We are spending a lot of money subsi-
dizing the insurance companies around something 
called Medicare Advantage, a program that gives them 
subsidies to accept Medicare recipients but doesn’t 
necessarily make people on Medicare healthier.”4 In 
November 2008, Senator Max Baucus, chair of the 
Senate Finance Committee, also called for the elimina-
tion of extra payments to MA plans: “Congress must 
act to level the playing field between traditional 
Medicare and Medicare Advantage payments and the 
Baucus plan would do so.”5 
The analysis in this paper updates our previous 
work on this issue6 by using the latest data from 
February 2009 on actual enrollment in MA plans and 
on MA county benchmark payment rates for 2009 to 
estimate the extra payments made to MA plans in that 
year relative to what the same enrollees would have 
cost under traditional fee-for-service Medicare.7 Based 
on those data, we calculate that payments to MA plans 
in 2009 exceed local fee-for-service costs by 13 per-
cent, or an average of $1,138 for each of the 10 mil-
lion Medicare enrollees in managed care,8 for a national 
total of $11.4 billion.9 This represents a 34 percent 
increase in MA extra payments from 2008 to 2009.10 
In the six years since the MMA was enacted, 
from 2004 to 2009, extra payments to MA plans are 
estimated to total nearly $44 billion.11
MA PlAn PAyMEnTS in 2009
Medicare payments to MA plans in 2009 are based on 
four factors:
The setting of county-level benchmark rates 1. 
according to rules specified in the MMA and sub-
sequent legislation;
The inclusion of the fee-for-service payment 2. 
adjustment for indirect medical education (IME) 
costs in the benchmark rates;
A budget-neutral risk-adjustment (BNRA) policy 3. 
that was put in place to offset the impact of risk 
adjustment on MA payments; and
The submission of bids that represent the payment 4. 
each plan would require to provide traditional 
Medicare benefits to its enrollees.
Medicare’s payments to each plan are deter-
mined by comparing the bid submitted by the plan 
with the benchmark rate in each county it serves, as 
described below.
County Benchmark Rates. For 2009, the benchmark 
value used to establish payment rates for MA plans in 
each county is set at the highest of eight reference 
rates. The first four are based on payment levels  
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established in March 2004, trended forward to 2009; 
the other four are based on per capita fee-for-service 
spending in a base year, trended forward to 2009. The 
eight reference rates used to set the MA benchmark 
rate for each county are:
A minimum rate, or floor, for large urban areas •	
(areas with populations of more than 250,000), 
which in 2009 is set at $9,738 per enrollee 
annually.
A floor for rural and smaller urban areas, which •	
in 2009 is set at $8,811 per enrollee annually.
A blended rate, which is a 50–50 combination •	
of the base MA plan payment rate for the 
county in 2004 and the national average MA 
plan payment rate in that year, updated to 
2009.12
A rate that reflects a minimum increase from •	
the county’s MA plan payment level in 2004, 
updated to 2009.13,14
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of esti-•	
mated county per capita spending under tradi-
tional fee-for-service Medicare in 2004, updated 
to 2009.15
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of esti-•	
mated county per capita spending under tradi-
tional Medicare in 2005, updated to 2009.16
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of esti-•	
mated county per capita spending under tradi-
tional Medicare in 2007, updated to 2009. 16
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of pro-•	
jected county per capita spending under tradi-
tional Medicare in 2009. 16
Because the benchmark rate for each county is 
the highest of these eight reference rates—which 
includes 100 percent of projected fee-for-service 
spending in 2009—that benchmark rate is, by defini-
tion, at least as high as what spending would have 
been expected to be for its enrollees had they been 
enrolled in traditional Medicare. On average, the 
county benchmark rates exceed projected fee-for-ser-
vice spending by 16.7 percent in 2009.
Inclusion of Indirect Medical Education Payments 
in Benchmark Rates. The MMA in 2003 explicitly 
provided that the calculation of the MA benchmark 
rate for each county should include an amount that 
reflects payments made under traditional Medicare to 
teaching hospitals for their indirect medical education 
costs, despite the fact that Medicare separately makes 
IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for MA 
enrollees admitted to those hospitals, under a policy 
enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 
Medicare therefore effectively pays twice for 
IME costs related to MA plan members.17 What’s 
more, while the direct payment goes to the teaching 
hospitals for which it is intended, the amount included 
in the calculation of the benchmark rate goes only to 
the plan. Whether that amount is, in the end, passed on 
to the teaching hospitals that serve the plan’s enrollees 
depends on the payment rates negotiated between each 
of those hospitals and the plan; but in any case, it is a 
double payment, because IME payments are made 
directly to the hospital. This double payment raises 
MA plan payments by about 2.2 percent in 2009.
The MIPPA legislation gradually phases out this 
component of MA payment rates beginning in 2010. 
This policy provides that the amount of IME payments 
to plans in each county will be reduced by 0.6 percent-
age points a year until it is eliminated. This provision, 
of course, will have no effect on MA payments in 
2009. But even if the full effect of eliminating the dou-
ble payment for IME were in place in 2009, MA plan 
payments would still exceed corresponding fee-for-ser-
vice costs by 10.8 percent.
It should also be noted that, in an arrangement 
similar to the additional payments that teaching hospi-
tals receive from Medicare for their IME costs, hospi-
tals that treat a disproportionate share of indigent 
patients receive a disproportionate share hospital 
(DSH) adjustment to their fee-for-service Medicare 
payments. While DSH payments are included in the 
payment rates for MA plans, no DSH payments are 
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made directly to hospitals for MA patients; it is left to 
each plan to determine how much of the DSH amount, 
if any, it will pay to the hospitals that its enrollees use. 
Medicare DSH payments are generally not related to 
the costs that individual plans face, and an argument 
could be made that they, like IME payments, should be 
removed from the MA payment rates and instead be 
paid directly to eligible hospitals for the MA patients 
they treat. Because a good estimate is not available for 
the county-level effect of DSH payments on MA pay-
ment rates, they are not included in the calculations in 
this analysis. However, they could be considered as 
representing additional overpayments to MA plans.
Budget-Neutral Risk-Adjustment (BNRA) Policy. 
Medicare adjusts its payments to MA plans for each 
beneficiary who enrolls by a risk-adjustment factor 
that accounts for variation in beneficiaries’ health sta-
tus and other determinants of the expected cost of pro-
viding care to different enrollees. Because the risk-
adjustment factor reflects variation in expected costs 
across the entire Medicare population, and because 
enrollees in MA plans tend to be healthier than the 
average Medicare beneficiary, risk adjustment has the 
effect of reducing total MA plan payments. 
Improvements in the risk-adjustment mechanism to 
provide more accurate adjustments, mandated in the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, were phased in begin-
ning in 2000. To counteract the potential adverse effect 
on MA plan payments, the BNRA policy was imple-
mented in 2003. This policy applied an across-the-
board increase to MA payment rates in every county to 
offset reductions resulting from improved risk adjust-
ment. With the application of the BNRA, the risk-
adjustment mechanism could affect the distribution of 
MA payments across beneficiaries and plans, but 
aggregate MA payments would be unaffected. In 2005, 
the BNRA policy increased MA payments in every 
county by 4 percent.18
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided for 
a phaseout of this increase in MA benchmark rates, 
with only 55 percent of the BNRA applied in 2007, 40 
percent in 2008, 25 percent in 2009, and 5 percent in 
2010. By 2011, MA payment rates will no longer be 
adjusted by this factor.19 In 2009, the BNRA policy 
will add approximately $900 million to MA payments.20
MA Plan Bidding Mechanism. Under the bidding 
mechanism established by the MMA, each MA plan 
submits a bid to represent the payment amount it 
would require for providing traditional Medicare bene-
fits to its enrollees. The bid submitted by each plan is 
compared with the benchmark rate in each county it 
serves, and each plan receives from Medicare a pay-
ment rate equal to the benchmark rate (if its bid is 
equal to or greater than the benchmark rate), or its bid 
plus a “rebate” of 75 percent of the difference between 
the benchmark rate and the bid (if its bid is less than 
the benchmark rate). For plans with bids greater than 
the benchmark rate, Medicare beneficiaries must pay 
the difference between the bid and the benchmark to 
enroll in the plan. Plans with bids less than the bench-
mark rate must either provide benefits beyond what is 
covered by traditional Medicare or provide for a 
reduction in enrollees’ out-of-pocket payments equal 
in actuarial value to the amount of the “rebate” pay-
ment. However, while these additional benefits may be 
attractive to MA plan enrollees—and, in fact, are 
thought to be the primary factor in spurring the sharp 
increase in MA enrollment over the past few years—
they are available only to those enrollees and not to 
other beneficiaries, even though they are funded out of 
general program funds.
It should be noted that while “bid” is the term 
the MMA uses for the amount submitted by each MA 
plan, it may not be just any amount the plan prefers 
but must be calculated by following the detailed 
“Instructions for Completing the Medicare Advantage 
Bid Pricing Tool.”21 The bid may thus be viewed  
as a kind of Medicare cost report for MA plans,  
and it is auditable by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.
Under this bidding mechanism, plans generally 
receive payments in excess of their estimated cost of 
providing traditional Medicare benefits to their enroll-
ees. Because of this, the average bid submitted by 
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plans has tended to drift upward over time. In 2009, 
the average MA plan bid was approximately 102 per-
cent of the corresponding Medicare fee-for-service 
costs in the plan’s service areas, although these bids 
varied considerably across types of plans: for health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), the average bid 
was 98 percent of local fee-for-service costs; for  
private fee-for-service plans, the average bid was 113 
percent of local fee-for-service costs.22 
vARiATiOn in ExTRA PAyMEnTS in 2009
The overall pattern of Medicare extra payments to MA 
plans in 2009 can be discerned by focusing on plans 
located in counties with three types of MA plan payments.
“Large Urban Floor” Counties. The largest aggre-
gate amount of extra payments goes to MA plans in 
the counties in which the large urban floor benchmark 
determines the MA payment rates. The extra payments 
received by MA plans in these counties amount to 
approximately $6 billion, or 53 percent of the $11.4 
billion in total extra payments in 2009. Extra payments 
to plans in these counties are estimated to average 
$1,361, or 17 percent, more per plan enrollee than the 
same person would be expected to cost under tradi-
tional fee-for-service Medicare.
“100 Percent of Fee-for-Service” Counties. In the 
counties where MA payments are determined by the 
100-percent-of-fee-for-service benchmark, total extra 
payments are estimated at over $3.4 billion, accounting 
for 30 percent of total extra payments nationwide. This 
seemingly anomalous finding—payments based on 
100 percent of fee-for-service costs exceeding fee-for-
service costs—is the result of three of the policies 
described above, which add to MA payments relative 
to patient care costs under traditional Medicare: 
First, the BNRA policy adds 0.9 percent to the •	
MA benchmarks in every county in 2009.
Second, the inclusion of the IME payment to •	
MA plans adds 2.2 percent, on average, to those 
benchmarks.
Third, and most important in this context, the •	
MA rebasing policy (the addition of new base 
years for determining 100 percent of fee-for-
service costs) has a “ratchet up but never down” 
component. This means that the addition of new 
base years may increase rates in some counties, 
but it never reduces them. Under this policy, 
plans in counties in which fee-for-service costs 
are increasing at a slower rate that the national 
average are paid at 100 percent of their local 
fee-for-service costs in an earlier base year, 
with that rate updated to 2009 using the higher 
national rate of increase. The MA county bench-
marks have been rebased in 2004, 2005, 2007, 
and 2009. The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) has estimated that eliminating the one-
sided rebasing process for MA benchmarks 
would reduce Medicare spending by $61 billion 
over 10 years.23
Rural Counties. Despite the initial concern in 1997 
over low MA payment rates in rural counties—which 
led to the implementation of the rural floor policy—
MA extra payments do not flow disproportionately to 
Medicare plans in rural areas. While 18.9 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries live in counties where MA pay-
ment rates are determined by the rural floor bench-
mark, in 2009 only $1.3 billion, or 11 percent, of MA 
extra payments go to plans in these counties. (The dis-
tribution of MA extra payments and enrollees by pay-
ment category is displayed in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.)
Extra payments to MA plans in 2009 vary greatly 
by state (see Appendix Table 3). Three patterns of MA 
extra payments across states are particularly important: 
First, the states with the greatest extra payments •	
per MA enrollee are, due to the urban floor pol-
icy, generally the ones with the lowest per cap-
ita fee-for-service costs. While Virginia’s 
Medicare fee-for-service costs are 14 percent 
below the national average, Florida’s are 12 
percent above.24
Although this relationship might appear to 
reduce the discrepancy between high- and  
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low-cost states, it actually provides a perverse 
incentive for beneficiaries in states with low 
fee-for-service costs to leave traditional 
Medicare while failing to provide the same 
attractive bonus for beneficiaries to enroll in 
plans in states with high fee-for-service costs. 
Plans in states where fee-for-service costs are 
already low thus are disproportionately 
rewarded by these extra payments, compared 
with plans in high-cost states. In fact, many of 
the states with low fee-for-service costs already 
have a high managed-care presence. Hawaii and 
Oregon, for example, are states where Kaiser 
Permanente has been a major presence for the 
60 years since the formation of the insurance 
plan after World War II. 
Second, the total amount of extra payments to •	
MA plans is highly concentrated among a rela-
tively small number of states. In 2009, 
California and New York accounted for over 
one-fourth of total extra payments, and more 
than half went to plans in six states. By con-
trast, the 30 states with the lowest total extra 
payments together accounted for just 15 percent 
of those payments.
Third, after 11 years of MA rural floor pay-•	
ments in excess of 100 percent of average fee-
for-service costs, fewer than 15 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries in rural counties are 
enrolled in MA plans in 2009, compared with 
nearly 25 percent of beneficiaries in urban 
counties. Thirty-five years of national experi-
ence with HMOs and managed care plans indi-
cates that private managed care plans have gen-
erally located and attracted enrollees in urban 
areas. This pattern is evident in commercial 
health insurance and Medicare. Moreover, MA 
plans that do operate in rural areas tend to be 
more expensive to Medicare than the fee-for-
service program.25
MA PlAn ExTRA PAyMEnTS SinCE 2003
The MMA increased MA payment rates beginning in 
March 2004. Since then, MA payment benchmarks 
have exceeded costs in traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare for every plan in every county in the nation. 
The annual amount of these extra payments has 
increased from $3.9 billion in 2004 to $11.4 billion in 
2009 (Figure 1), with a cumulative six-year cost of 
$44 billion.
Total extra payments have increased because of 
growth in the amount of extra payments per MA plan 
enrollee and growth in the total number of enrollees: 
Extra payments per enrollee were $795, or 11.9 •	
percent above fee-for-service costs in 2004, rose 
to $1,037, or 14.1 percent above fee-for-service 
costs in 2006, and are at $1,138, or 13 percent 
above fee-for-service costs in 2009 (Figure 2).  
Figure 1. Trends in Total Extra Payments 
to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans, 2004–2009
Sources: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) Medicare Advantage enrollment and payment rate data for 2004–2009, 
and Medicare Payment Advisory Commission analysis of MA plan bids for 2006–2009. 
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Meanwhile, the number of Medicare beneficia-•	
ries enrolled in MA plans has increased from 
4.8 million in 2004, or 13 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries, to over 10 million in February 
2009, or 23 percent of Medicare beneficiaries 
(Figure 3).
The CBO has attributed the increase in MA 
enrollment to the extra payments received by MA 
plans. They projected in 2007 that a policy of paying 
MA plans at 100 percent of fee-for-service costs at the 
county level—that is, of eliminating the extra pay-
ments—would reduce projected MA enrollment in 
2012 from 12.5 million to 6.2 million Medicare bene-
ficiaries, a number only slightly higher than MA 
enrollment in 2005.26 The CBO also estimated in 
December 2008 that the resulting reduction in Medicare 
spending would total $55 billion over the five years 
from 2010 through 2014, and $157 billion over the 10 
years from 2010 through 2019 (Figure 4).27
COnCluSiOnS
Current MA payment policies, enacted beginning with 
the MMA in 2003, have spurred greater enrollment in 
Medicare private plans at substantially higher costs to 
Medicare. This is primarily due to extra payments—
payments in excess of Medicare fee-for-service 
costs—going to private plans. In 2009, for each of the 
10 million Medicare enrollees in managed care, 
Medicare will spend an average of $1,138, or 13  
percent, more than it would for comparable beneficia-
ries in traditional fee-for-service Medicare, with extra 
payments to MA plans totaling $11.4 billion.
These extra payments vary widely across geo-
graphic areas: the average annual amount per MA 
enrollee by state ranges from $2,521, or 38 percent 
above average fee-for-service costs, in Hawaii, to 
$159, or 2 percent above average fee-for-service costs, 
in Nevada.  
Overall, extra payments to MA private plans 
have increased Medicare costs by $44 billion in the six 
years since the MMA was implemented. Even with the 
changes enacted in 2008 as part of MIPPA, the CBO 
projects that MA extra payments will add more than 
$150 billion to Medicare costs over the next 10 years.
The initial rationale for paying Medicare more 
than costs in fee-for-service—to bring plans to rural 
areas and benefits to rural beneficiaries—has not been 
borne out. Ten years after the rural payment floor was 
established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, pay-
ments of 14 percent above average fee-for-services 
costs have resulted in the enrollment of only 15 per-
cent of rural beneficiaries in MA plans. Counties 
where the rural floor applies contain 19 percent of 
total Medicare beneficiaries but receive only 11 per-
cent of extra payments, because the vast majority of 
their beneficiaries, 85 percent, remain in traditional 
Medicare. Moreover, the MA plans in those areas tend 
to be more expensive than traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare. If the goal of special policies for rural areas 
Figure 3. Enrollment in Medicare Managed Care Plans 
as Percentage of Total Medicare Beneficiaries, 1995–2009
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare and Medicare managed 
care enrollment data 1966-2001, 2002-2009. Data for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2008 are for 
the quarters ending in December of those years. Data for 2009 are as of February 2009. 
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is to improve health services to the elderly and dis-
abled who live in those areas, redirecting the $1.3 bil-
lion a year in extra payments away from rural MA 
plans to increase payments to rural physicians and  
hospitals would be a more effective—and far more 
equitable—approach.
The projected $150 billion-plus in extra pay-
ments nationwide over the next 10 years could simi-
larly be better used. In Medicare, these funds could 
help offset the costs of benefit improvements for low-
income beneficiaries, such as reducing Part B premi-
ums, increasing eligibility for low-income subsidies in 
Medicare Part D, or reducing Part D copayments. The 
$150 billion could also offset part of the more than 
$1.2 trillion projected 10-year cost of expanding health 
insurance to 47 million uninsured Americans.
Given the positions taken by the Obama cam-
paign and comments by the president since the elec-
tion—that Medicare private plans should be paid the 
same as costs in traditional fee-for-service Medicare—
future analysis of MA plan payments may focus on the 
most equitable way to make those payments more 
comparable to Medicare fee-for-service costs. While 
Medicare plan payments have been based on fee-for-
service costs at the county level since 1992, there has 
been discussion of new rates based on a blend of 
national and local county fee-for-service costs, or on 
broad metropolitan area and state average costs. These 
payment policies would result in some plans continu-
ing to be paid more than local fee-for-service costs, 
while others would be paid less than costs in the 
county. Such a policy could be used to provide 
increased incentives for private plans to reduce costs 
in high-cost areas. But it would have to be structured 
in a way that allows private plans to better accomplish 
their intended role—to develop innovations in quality, 
efficiency, and patient service; to spur traditional 
Medicare to better performance; and to offer  
beneficiaries a choice of the best of both worlds. 
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from the $8.5 billion in extra payments for 2008. In addi-
tion, during this period, MA enrollment increased from 
9.2 million to 10 million, or 8.5 percent. These 800,000 
new MA plan enrollees account for $9.1 million, or 8 
percent, of the 2009 extra payments.
11 The $44 billion figure is based on George Washington 
University analysis of enrollment and payments to MA 
plans in 2004 through 2009. Note: In estimating (in 
December 2003) the future costs of the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), the Congressional 
Budget Office projected that the new MA payment poli-
cies would add just $5.2 billion to Medicare costs from 
2004 to 2008, and $14.2 billion from 2004 to 2013. The 
Medicare Office of the Actuary estimated the additional 
10-year costs due to the MA program at $46 billion. 
These estimates would have applied only to the new 
MMA MA payment policies and not to the continuation 
of the rural and urban floor policies adopted in 1997 and 
2000. See Congressional Budget Office, Letter to 
Congressman Jim Nussle (Washington, D.C.: CBO, Feb. 
2, 2004), available at www.cbo.gov, accessed April 1, 
2004.
12 The base Medicare Advantage rate for 2004 for each 
county is its 1997 risk plan rate, updated to 2004; the 
national average base Medicare Advantage rate for 2004 
is the average base rate for 2004 across all counties, 
weighted by Medicare enrollment.
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13 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to 
Medicare Advantage Organizations, Prescription Drug 
Plan Sponsors, and Other Interested Parties. Subject: 
Announcement of Calendar Year 2009 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage 
and Part D Payment Policies (Washington, D.C.: CMS, 
April 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/
Announcement2009.pdf.
14 The MMA provides for the annual minimum increase to 
be either 2 percent or the Medicare national growth rate 
percentage in fee-for-service expenditures, whichever is 
higher. Because the projected national growth rate for 
2009 was 4.24 percent, payments in all counties were 
increased by at least that amount.
15 This payment rate includes Medicare payments for indi-
rect medical education costs, even though Medicare 
makes such payments to teaching hospitals directly for 
MA enrollees; the effect of this double counting was to 
set rates an average of 2.2 percent higher than actual 
Medicare fee-for-service costs.
16 The MMA requires that the estimates of per capita fee-
for-service costs used as benchmark MA rates be rebased 
(updated) a minimum of every three years. Those esti-
mates were rebased in 2005, 2007, and 2009. Note that 
counties for which rebasing would result in a decrease in 
the benchmark rate from their previous levels continue to 
use the old benchmark updated to the current payment 
year (that is to say, rebasing can only raise benchmark 
rates, not lower them). See Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services,  Note to Medicare Advantage 
Organizations and Other Interested Parties. Subject: 
Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for 
Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage (MA) 
Payment Rates (Washington, D.C.: CMS, 2004); avail-
able at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.
pdf.
17 To calculate the effect of these double payments on the 
level of payments to MA plans, MedPAC and other ana-
lysts reduce the per capita fee-for-service costs in a 
county by the per capita IME costs in the county. This is 
done by deflating the county fee-for-service average by a 
factor of 1–(0.65 × GME), where GME is the county 
graduate medical education carve-out and 0.65 represents 
the national average percentage of GME payments that 
goes to indirect medical education (county-specific data 
are unavailable). Because Medicare makes IME pay-
ments directly to teaching hospitals for patients who are 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage, MA payment rates are 
most appropriately compared with fee-for-service costs 
adjusted in this manner. Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment 
Policy (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, March 2002).
18 B. Biles, L.H. Nicholas, B.S. Cooper, E. Adrion, and S. 
Guterman, The Cost of Privatization: Extra Payments to 
Medicare Advantage Plans—Updated and Revised (New 
York: The Commonwealth Fund, Nov. 2006).
19 2010 estimate based on Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage 
Organizations, Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors, and 
Other Interested Parties. Subject: Advance Notice of 
Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2010 
for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Part 
C and Part D Payment Policies (Washington, D.C.: 
CMS, Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/
Advance2010.pdf.
20 The BNRA payment policy, originally implemented 
administratively but codified in the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 (DRA), adds about $900,000 million to total 
extra payments in 2009. This is less than the $1.8 billion 
BNRA contributed to extra payments in 2005 (or roughly 
one-third of total extra payments in 2005). When BNRA 
payment policy was formally recognized in statute 
through the DRA, it included a schedule to phase out the 
BNRA from 2006 through 2010.
21 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
Instructions for Completing the Medicare Advantage Bid 
Pricing Tool and Medical Savings Account Bid Pricing 
Tool for Contract Year 2009 (Washington, D.C.: CMS 
April 7, 2008) available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/09_Bid_Forms_and_
Instructions.asp.
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22 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report to the 
Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, chapter 3.
23 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options Volume 1: 
Health Care, p. 123 (Washington, D.C.: CBO Dec. 2008) 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/
doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf.
24 George Washington University analysis of Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed 
Care State/County/Contract Data File, released February 
2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration 
Data File, released Feb. 2009; and the Medicare 
Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
25 See B. Biles, E. Adrion, and S. Guterman, Medicare 
Advantage’s Private Fee-for-Service Plans: Paying for 
Coordinated Care Without the Coordination (New York: 
The Commonwealth Fund, Oct. 2008).
26 Congressional Budget Office, Statement of Peter R. 
Orszag, Director, on the Medicare Advantage Program 
before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Washington, D.C.: CBO, June 28, 
2007).
27 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options Volume 1: 
Health Care,” p.119.
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Appendix Table 1. Estimated Extra Payments in 2009, by County Payment Category, 
to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans Relative to Average Fee-for-Service (FFS) Costs1
Average MA Plan Payment Greater 
than FFS Costs2,3
County 
Payment Type
Medicare 
Beneficiaries4
MA Plan 
Enrollees5
Total Annual 
Extra Payments 
to MA Plans 
(millions)
Average Extra 
Amount per MA 
Plan Enrollee
Average Extra Payment 
to MA Plans Greater than 
FFS Costs 
National 44,575,208 10,014,280 $11,396 $1,138 13.0%
Rural Floor 8,402,542 1,230,122 1,282 1,042 13.9%
Urban Floor 17,801,463 4,412,726 6,004 1,361 16.8%
Blend 419,735 138,824 238 1,714 20.8%
Minimum Update 886,265 228,259 422 1,850 18.5%
100% FFS 20046 11,579,729 2,869,501 2,873 1,001 10.6%
100% FFS 2005 6 2,467,028 432,088 364 842 8.8%
100% FFS 20076 1,870,204 374,959 305 813 8.1%
100% FFS 20096 1,148,242 327,801 -92 -281 -2.2%
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released 
February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
1  Payments to MA plans include the cost of indirect medical education payments and a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.009.
2  Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans.
3  In 2006 and future years, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to 
one that combines county benchmarks with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75 percent of the difference between the county 
benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan and 25 percent to the federal government if the plan’s bid falls below the benchmark. If the plan’s bid lies above the benchmark, the 
plan is paid the benchmark, and plan enrollees pay the difference between the benchmark and the plan bid in the form of premiums. Analysts at the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that, for 2009, the average MA plan bid is approximately 16 percent less than 
the county benchmark. This would result in average MA plan payments equal to a 4 percent reduction from the county benchmark. The above calculations account for the fact 
that average MA plan bids fall 16 percent below the 2009 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Medicare Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public 
Meeting, Dec. 5, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2008).
4  Medicare beneficiary totals as of February 2009.  Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
5  Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2009.  Calculations exclude MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
6  CMS decided to rebase the 100 percent of FFS rate at the county level in 2005, 2007, and 2009. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per capita FFS 
expenditures for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA 
plans in 2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6 percent. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to 
Medicare Advantage Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates 
(Washington, D.C.: CMS, March 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1 percent. See: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact 
Sheet (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
For 2009, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2009 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2008 rate increased by 4.24 percent. See: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations, Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors, and Other Interested Parties. Subject: Announcement of Calendar 
Year 2009 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2009.pdf.
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Appendix Table 2. 2009 Distributions, by County Payment Category, of Medicare Beneficiaries, Medicare 
Advantage (MA) Plan Enrollees, MA Enrollment Rates, and Estimated Extra Payments to MA Plans
County 
Payment Type
Distribution 
of Medicare 
Beneficiaries
Distribution 
of MA Plan Enrollees
MA Plan Enrollment 
Rate
Distribution 
of MA Plan 
Extra Payments
National 100.0% 100.0% 22.5% 100.0%
Rural Floor 18.9% 12.3% 14.6% 11.3%
Urban Floor 39.9% 44.1% 24.8% 52.7%
Blend 0.9% 1.4% 33.1% 2.1%
Minimum Update 2.0% 2.3% 25.8% 3.7%
100% FFS 20041 26.0% 28.7% 24.8% 25.2%
100% FFS 20051 5.5% 4.3% 17.5% 3.2%
100% FFS 20071 4.2% 3.7% 20.0% 2.7%
100% FFS 20091 2.6% 3.3% 28.5% -0.8%
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released 
February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
1  CMS decided to rebase the 100 percent of fee-for-service (FFS) rate at the county level in 2005, 2007, and 2009. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per 
capita FFS expenditures for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) 
provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in 2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6 percent. See: 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar 
Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates (Washington, D.C.: CMS, March 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/
Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1 percent. See: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact 
Sheet (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
For 2009, the county level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2009 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2008 rate increased by 4.24 percent. See: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations, Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors, and Other Interested Parties. Subject: Announcement of Calendar 
Year 2009 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2009.pdf.
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Appendix Table 3. Estimated Extra Payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans in 2009 
Compared with Average Fee-for-Service (FFS) Costs, by State1
Average MA Plan Payment 
Greater than FFS Costs2,3
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries4
MA Plan 
Enrollees5
MA Plan 
Enrollment Rate
Average 
Extra Amount 
per MA Plan 
Enrollee
Total Extra 
Payments to 
MA Plans 
(millions)
Average Extra 
Payment to MA 
Plans Greater 
than FFS 
Costs
National 44,575,208 10,014,280 22.5% $1,138 $11,396 13.0%
Rural6 13,413,831 1,887,657 14.1% 969 1,828 12.2%
Urban6 31,151,025 8,126,490 26.1% 1,177 9,567 13.2%
Alabama 813,060 170,929 21.0% 842 144 9.8%
Alaska 60,875 640 1.1% 1,218 1 13.7%
Arizona 876,576 323,823 36.9% 856 277 10.1%
Arkansas 511,604 67,808 13.3% 1,106 75 14.0%
California 4,528,527 1,570,931 34.7% 1,107 1,739 12.0%
Colorado 585,726 173,014 29.5% 974 168 11.5%
Connecticut 550,462 87,916 16.0% 605 53 6.7%
Delaware 141,606 6,627 4.7% 719 5 8.6%
D.C. 75,338 3,244 4.3% 1,745 6 19.1%
Florida 3,226,443 922,369 28.6% 310 286 3.0%
Georgia 1,165,638 169,945 14.6% 1,127 192 13.8%
Hawaii 195,961 37,902 19.3% 2,521 96 37.8%
Idaho 216,070 57,219 26.5% 1,516 87 20.2%
Illinois 1,781,355 168,079 9.4% 696 117 7.9%
Indiana 967,042 132,303 13.7% 1,281 169 16.3%
Iowa 506,384 56,193 11.1% 1,662 93 23.2%
Kansas 419,221 40,914 9.8% 1,210 49 14.8%
Kentucky 731,038 103,977 14.2% 975 101 12.0%
Louisiana 660,165 146,528 22.2% 1,699 249 17.1%
Maine 254,820 23,921 9.4% 1,574 38 21.5%
Maryland 748,964 36,215 4.8% 425 15 4.3%
Massachusetts 1,022,653 195,785 19.1% 1,130 221 12.7%
Michigan 1,586,269 380,956 24.0% 832 317 9.7%
Minnesota 753,649 175,517 23.3% 737 129 8.8%
Mississippi 480,458 43,827 9.1% 745 33 8.3%
Missouri 969,993 190,434 19.6% 1,344 256 16.7%
Montana 161,569 27,046 16.7% 1,153 31 15.6%
Nebraska 272,077 29,612 10.9% 1,088 32 13.7%
Nevada 333,754 102,927 30.8% 159 16 1.6%
New Hampshire 206,719 12,229 5.9% 1,212 15 15.2%
New Jersey 1,286,869 152,989 11.9% 810 124 8.7%
New Mexico 296,739 71,462 24.1% 2,211 158 31.8%
New York 2,901,918 822,535 28.3% 1,682 1,383 18.7%
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Average MA Plan Payment 
Greater than FFS Costs2,3
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries4
MA Plan 
Enrollees5
MA Plan 
Enrollment Rate
Average 
Extra Amount 
per MA Plan 
Enrollee
Total Extra 
Payments to 
MA Plans 
(millions)
Average Extra 
Payment to MA 
Plans Greater 
than FFS 
Costs
North Carolina 1,412,487 244,055 17.3% 1,436 350 18.4%
North Dakota 106,505 6,984 6.6% 1,328 9 18.4%
Ohio 1,842,533 471,989 25.6% 1,166 551 14.3%
Oklahoma 581,751 83,262 14.3% 513 43 5.6%
Oregon 588,158 244,823 41.6% 1,767 433 23.7%
Pennsylvania 2,226,572 842,648 37.8% 1,167 984 13.7%
Rhode Island 178,103 64,713 36.3% 1,609 104 20.6%
South Carolina 727,532 105,515 14.5% 1,189 125 14.9%
South Dakota 132,589 9,424 7.1% 1,320 12 18.2%
Tennessee 1,007,941 221,207 21.9% 1,046 231 12.7%
Texas 2,831,789 488,491 17.3% 1,550 757 16.1%
Utah 266,656 79,422 29.8% 1,320 105 16.7%
Vermont 105,684 3,800 3.6% 1,244 5 17.1%
Virginia 1,087,696 132,793 12.2% 1,764 234 24.0%
Washington 910,452 215,825 23.7% 1,600 345 21.0%
West Virginia 373,490 73,546 19.7% 1,250 92 16.0%
Wisconsin 877,725 216,329 24.6% 1,551 336 20.8%
Wyoming 76,549 3,638 4.8% 784 3 9.8%
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released 
February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
1  Payments to MA plans include the cost of indirect medical education payments and a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.009.
2  Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans.
3  In 2006 and future years, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to 
one that combines county benchmarks with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75 percent of the difference between the county 
benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan and 25 percent to the federal government if the plan’s bid falls below the benchmark. If the plan’s bid lies above the benchmark, the 
plan is paid the benchmark, and plan enrollees pay the difference between the benchmark and the plan bid in the form of premiums. Analysts at the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that, for 2009, the average MA plan bid is approximately 16 percent less than the 
county benchmark. This would result in MA plan payments equal to a 4 percent reduction from the county benchmark. The above calculations account for the fact that average MA 
plan bids fall 16 percent below the 2009 MA benchmark rates. 
See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Medicare Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public Meeting, Dec. 5, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2008).
4  Medicare beneficiary totals as of February 2009.  Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
5  Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2009.  Calculations exclude MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
6  County designations from the 2005 American Community Survey.
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study methods
This report’s 2009 analysis is based on Medicare Advantage payment rates and fee-for-service expenditure 
averages posted by county in the 2009 Medicare Advantage Rate Calculation Data spreadsheet of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).i The number of Medicare beneficiaries and Medicare Advantage 
enrollees by county is taken from the CMS State/County Penetration Data file and the CMS State/County/Contract 
Data file for February 2009. These data are posted on the CMS Website, http://www.cms.hhs.gov.ii
The county is the basic unit of analysis, as Medicare sets MA plan payment rates at the county level. For 2009, 
Medicare benchmark rates for MA plans in each county are set at the highest of eight different reference points: 
a floor rate for counties in large urban areas; a floor rate for other counties; a blended rate (consisting of 50 percent 
of the county-specific base MA payment rate and 50 percent of the national average base MA payment rate); a 
minimum update over the previous year’s payment rate; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per capita fee-for-
service costs in the county in 2004, trended forward to 2009; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per capita 
fee-for-service costs in the county in 2005, trended forward to 2009; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per 
capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2007, trended forward to 2009; or a payment rate equal to 100 percent 
of per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2009. The MMA provides for the annual minimum increase in 
MA plan payments to be the Medicare national growth-rate percentage in fee-for-service expenditures, which is 
4.24 percent for 2009.
Extra payments to Medicare Advantage plans are calculated for each of the more than 3,000 counties in the United 
States in 2009. Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands are not included in the analysis. All 
calculations are MA plan enrollee-weighted to reflect variations in enrollment and payment rates.
Over 300,000 MA enrollees are in Medicare “cost” plans, paid on the basis of costs. Although these beneficiaries 
(identified through the CMS Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data file for February 2009) receive 
Medicare benefits through managed-care plans, they do not generate extra payments based on MA plan payment 
rates.iii  Cost beneficiaries were removed from the Medicare Advantage enrollee totals by county, but are included 
in the number of overall Medicare beneficiaries.
This analysis follows a methodological convention developed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) in addressing the Medicare policy of making direct payments to teaching hospitals for the costs of 
indirect medical education (IME) for MA enrollees. MedPAC adjusts fee-for-service costs at the county level by 
removing the average IME expense. This is done by deflating the county fee-for-service average by a factor of 
1–(0.65 x GME), where GME is the county graduate medical education carve-out, and 0.65 represents the national 
average percentage of GME payments that goes to IME; county-specific data are unavailable. Because Medicare 
makes IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for patients who are enrolled in Medicare Advantage, MA plan 
payment rates are most appropriately compared with fee-for-service costs adjusted in this manner.iv
Budget-neutral risk adjustments to 2009 payments to Medicare Advantage plans provide additional extra payments 
to MA plans. This analysis of extra payments includes a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.009 for 2009.v
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